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Abstract Darwin’s theory predicts that linguistic behavior
gradually evolved out of animal forms of communication
(signaling). However, this prediction is confronted by the
conceptual problem that there is an essential difference
between signaling and linguistic behavior: using words is a
normative practice. It is argued that we can resolve this
problem if we (1) note that language evolution is the out-
come of an evolutionary transition, and (2) observe that the
use of words evolves during ontogenesis out of babbling. It
is discussed that language evolved as the result of an
expansion of the vocalizing powers of our ancestors. This
involved an increase in the volitional control of our speech
apparatus (leading to the ability to produce new combina-
tions of vowels and consonants), but also the evolution of
socially guided learning. It resulted in unique human
abilities, namely doing things with words and later rea-
soning and giving reasons.
Keywords Animal signals  Babbling  Evolutionary
transition  Language evolution  Socially guided learning
Introduction
Humans are unique because they are language-using
creatures. This observation raises the question of how and
why language evolved in only the human species. The
precise answer to this question is under discussion, but it is
clear that there are many adaptations involved. Walking
upright was probably the first step toward linguistic
behavior, because it resulted in a change in the position of
the larynx (enabling hominids to expand their vocalizing
powers) and freed the hands from the constraints imposed
by quadrupedal locomotion (they could be used in a wide
range of new contexts unrelated to their prior functions,
e.g., for gestures such as pointing). The expansion of our
vocalizing powers and the use of gestures created oppor-
tunities for new ways of communication (e.g., triadic
interactions involving pointing facilitated the evolution of
linguistic communication about objects). In combination
with the capacity to produce consonants and vowels, it
resulted in the evolution of the use of words. And the use of
words was a first step on the long road to the use of a
complex language with a grammar.
Language evolution enabled humans to provide others
with information and to seek and acquire information from
others. It increased the opportunities for cooperation, but
also for cheating, free riding, and so on. In this article I
discuss how the transition from animal forms of commu-
nication to linguistic behavior was possibly accomplished.
How did language evolve out of animal forms of com-
munication? What are possible precursors of linguistic
behavior? In order to answer these questions, I first discuss
in the following two sections evolutionary explanations of
animal communication and elaborate some differences
between animal (referential) signals and linguistic behav-
ior. Next I discuss how the use of words may have evolved
out of babbling. Babbling occurs at a high frequency in
human infancy and is involved in communicative behavior,
that is, in turn taking and later triadic interactions involving
objects. The vocalizations produced by infants change over
time and culminate in the use of words. Yet an explanation
of the transition from babbling to using words requires
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conceptual investigations, since there is an essential dif-
ference between babbling and using words. Using words is,
and babbling is not, a normative practice, for it involves the
correct and incorrect application of rules for the use of
words. I shall discuss this conceptual problem and its reso-
lution in the ‘‘Using a Language is a Normative Activ-
ity’’ section. In the last three sections before the conclusion I
discuss how the transition from babbling to the rule-gov-
erned practice of using words may have been accomplished.
The Evolution of Animal Signals
Evolutionary theorists (e.g., Maynard Smith and Harper
2003; Scott-Phillips 2015) ask how linguistic behavior
evolved out of animal forms of communication and use
evolutionary theory as an explicatory framework. This
framework consists of technical terms made appropriate for
studying the fitness effects of communicative behavior, but
some of these terms have a non-technical meaning in
human practices. This may create confusion if we conflate
the rules for the use of technical and ordinary terms. I shall
briefly discuss how conceptual investigations clarify the
rules for the use of ordinary terms, discuss rules for the use
of some ordinary terms involved in human communication,
and then continue with technical (evolutionary) definitions.
Conceptual studies investigate the rules for the use of
everyday words (for example: ‘‘mind,’’ ‘‘state,’’ ‘‘ability,’’
‘‘body,’’ ‘‘emotion,’’ ‘‘sensation,’’ ‘‘intention,’’ and ‘‘mean-
ing’’). These investigations are not empirical but a priori
investigations. Consequently, the results may not, at first
glance, appear to be novel, for these rules are familiar to a
competent user of a language. For example it is not an
empirical discovery that emotions, in contrast to abilities
(e.g., like the ability to calculate or to understand a lan-
guage), have genuine duration, intensity, and that some
emotions have a characteristic facial expression.
Yet although conceptual investigations lead to insights that a
competent user of a language can understand, they may result
in novel insights if we were misled by a misconception or
were not aware of some conceptual features. Suppose we did
not realize that, for example, meaning something is not like
being in a mental state (like feeling anxious or cheerful). It is
then possible that, when we are investigating a segment of
our language (the intra-linguistic relationships between
meaning, ability, etc.), we will come to know things we had
not previously known. We do not learn then new facts about
the world, but features of our means of representation. We
realize now that when we say that ‘‘Meaning is not being in a
mental state,’’ this is not a description of an empirical state of
affairs (or a hypothesis), but an expression of an exclusionary
rule (like ‘‘One cannot checkmate in draughts’’ or ‘‘Nothing
can be red and green all over at the same time’’). This rule or
conceptual proposition says that there is no such thing as a
mental state of meaning. Notice that the rule is dressed up in
the deceptive guise of an empirical description. Also notice
that not all conceptual propositions are exclusionary rules.
Some are inference rules (e.g., ‘‘Red is darker than pink’’; if
A is red, then the rule licenses us to infer that A is darker than
pink); others explanations of meaning in the guise of
descriptions of essences, rules for the transformation of
descriptions, substitution rules, and so on and so forth.
The terms ‘‘signal,’’ ‘‘sign,’’ and ‘‘expression’’ have both
an ordinary meaning and technical meaning (in the context
of evolutionary studies). I first discuss some non-technical
meanings. Smoke is a sign of fire. We can reliably infer fire
from seeing smoke. Humans use the emitted smoke of a fire
to signal something, for example danger to another group,
or to signal the election of a new Pope. The word ‘‘snake’’
is not a sign of something, but a sign for something. It is
not connected to what it represents by causal dependency,
but by conventional meaning. There are also examples of
non-verbal conventional meaning (Hacker 2013). Nonver-
bal conventional meaning may be iconic or gestural. Iconic
signs may be signs for something (e.g., icons on one’s
computer), insignia of something or someone (coats of
arms), or signs to do something (permitting, forbidding, or
requiring one to do something, e.g., stop at the red lights).
Gestures, such as nodding or shaking one’s head, or thumbs
up or down, likewise signify by convention. There is evi-
dence that, for example, chimpanzees and bonobos also use
gestures to signify something (see, e.g., Clay et al. 2015;
Genty and Zuberbu¨hler 2015). Expressions of emotions or
sensations are not signs of or for something, but criteria for
sensations or emotions. When we observe, for example,
expressions of sensations such as pain, whether these are
displayed by animals in their nonverbal behavior or by
humans in both nonverbal and linguistic behavior, then we
do not infer that an animal has a pain when it expresses
pain in its behavior (facial expression, screaming out of
pain) or when a human says that he has a pain in his left
arm. There is also no external, inductive relation between
an emotional expression and what it is an emotion of (by
contrast: rain clouds are inductive signs of rain). The nexus
between behavior and what it means is non-inductive: the
behavior simply manifests what it signifies (while clouds
do not manifest rain and smoke does not express fire).
Evolutionary theorists study the problem of how and
why animal signals evolved and whether linguistic
behavior is rooted in animal signaling. They use a technical
definition of a signal. Scott-Phillips (2008) offers the fol-
lowing definition (a slightly modified version from the one
used by Maynard Smith and Harper (2003)): a signal is any
act or structure that (1) affects the behavior of other
organisms; (2) evolved because of those effects; and (3)
which is effective because the effect (the response) has
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evolved to be affected by the act or structure. Two elabo-
rations clarify why this definition is (made) appropriate for
evolutionary studies. First, it differentiates between a push
and a signal that leads another organism to move, for the
signal, in contrast to the push, is selected to affect another
organism. Second, the definition also clarifies the role of
the receiver in the interaction: the response to the signal
has also been selected for. According to the definition,
communication occurs when an interaction involving cor-
responding signal and response is completed. Note that
signaling can evolve in both competitive (e.g., fighting over
a territory) and cooperative (e.g., cooperative breeding)
contexts. Note also that the definition does not mention the
concept of ‘‘information.’’
The definition clarifies how we can distinguish signals
from coercion and cues (see Table 1). Again, coercion and
cues are used here as technical terms. An example of a cue
is the height of a predator: it is not selected for the purpose
of affecting the receiver, but can elicit a response because
height may be associated with danger. The push-example
mentioned above is an example of coercion but not of a
signal, for the receiver is not adapted here to respond to the
behavior.
Signals evolved from cues and coercion (Maynard
Smith and Harper 2003; Scott-Phillips et al. 2012). They
evolved from cues by a process called ritualization (Tin-
bergen 1952). A well-known example is teeth-baring in
dogs. According to this hypothesis, teeth-baring evolved
into a signal because it could be noticed by the receiver and
predicted what the dog was going to do next (namely bit-
ing). By noticing the bared teeth, the receiver could
anticipate an attack and could, for example, flee or start
threatening before being attacked (reducing the fitness
costs of injuries). As a result of the process of ritualization
(involving selection on both sender and receiver), teeth-
baring evolved then into a separate threat signal which is
now displayed during contests. In terms of the definition
discussed above, teeth-baring was first a cue and later
evolved into a signal indicating, at the proximate level, a
tendency or fighting ability of an animal. Another example
illustrating ritualization is the use of urine to mark terri-
torial boundaries. At first urine was a cue when the focal
animal relieved itself because of extreme fear (occurring
when the animal left the center of its own territory). The
presence of urine could then draw the attention of other
animals visiting the area to the presence of the focal
individual. As a result of selection on both sender and
receiver, this cue could evolve into a signal indicating the
territory. In sensory manipulation signals evolved from
behaviors that were originally coercive (Ryan 1990).
Mating displays may have begun by the process of sensory
manipulation because of the preference of females for
certain objects, enabling males to manipulate them. For
example, in many insects males offer females a nuptial gift
(e.g., a prey) in exchange for copulation, and this may have
begun because females already had a preference for the
prey. Another example is the preference of female birds,
when they forage, for a certain color (say red) because this
color is associated with seeds. Males can then add red to
their plumage or build a nest with red objects to exploit this
preference and can enhance in this way their reproductive
opportunities. Scott-Phillips et al. (2012) argue that there is
an important difference between ritualization and sensory
manipulation. In ritualization the cue (e.g., bared teeth)
manifests a tendency or fighting ability. Receivers attend-
ing to the cue have a fitness benefit if they notice the cue. In
sensory manipulation, by contrast, attending to the coercive
behavior does not need to benefit the receiver because the
proto-signal does not manifest a tendency already present
in the sender. Because of this difference, the likelihood that
signals evolved from cues is greater than that coerced
behaviors became signals. There is empirical evidence
showing that animal signals evolved more often from
ritualization than from sensory manipulation. Is it possible
that signals evolved directly, i.e., without first passing
through a stage of cueing or coercion? This is unlikely, for
direct emergence of communicative signals requires (1)
mutations occurring at the same time in both sender and
receiver, and (2) that these mutations affect different yet
complementary brain structures and processes in the sender
and receiver.
Animal signals did not only evolve out of behaviors, but
also out of features of the sympathetic and parasympathetic
systems because these cause bodily reactions accompany-
ing the expressions of sensations and emotions (e.g.,
sweating, surface blood-vessel dilatation, thermoregula-
tion). Some bodily reactions obtained a signaling function
through the process of ritualization. For example, in
chimpanzees ‘‘erect hairs’’ evolved as a signal displayed
during contests. In humans ‘‘blushing’’ is a well-known
example. It is displayed when someone is embarrassed by
his or her misbehavior.
Ethologists have argued in the past that signals evolved
to facilitate communication. They thought that ritualized
signals (revealing the ‘‘tendency’’ or ‘‘motivation’’ of the
sender) were selected because these reduced the costs
Table 1 Distinction between signal, cue, and coercion (adapted from
Scott-Phillips 2008)
Signaler’s behavior
evolved for purpose of
affecting receiver?
Receiver’s response evolved
to be affected by signaler’s
behavior?
Signal Y Y
Cue N Y
Coercion Y N
160 H. Smit
123
involved in violent encounters. However, the problem is
that ethologists invoked the old notion of group selection
(Maynard Smith and Price 1973). They simply assumed
that the evolution of ritualized signals was beneficial for
the group because it saved lives and prevented injuries
(increasing the fitness of the group as a whole). The
problems facing the old notion of group selection are well
known: groups consisting of individuals sending and
responding to ‘‘reliable signals’’ are susceptible to the
invasion of a cheater. Suppose that a sender always
(whatever his plans) sends the signal that he will attack (or
exaggerates a threat signal). Because receivers will always
respond to this signal by retreat (in the model of ethologists
it is assumed that the signal is always a reliable signal of
his tendency to attack), this cheater will invade the popu-
lation because he has fitness benefits (he wins every con-
test). This model shows that signals are not simply selected
because they benefit the group, as ethologists assumed, but
that we have to explain with the aid of evolutionary
models, why, on average, reliable signals evolved (see,
among others, Johnstone and Grafen 1993; Maynard Smith
and Harper 2003). The point to notice is that, because
signaling systems are ‘‘communicative cooperative,’’ sig-
naling systems are only stable if signaling benefits both
sender and receiver. Otherwise there will be selection in
favor of a different response of the individual that does not
benefit from the system.
Meaning Something by a Signal and a Linguistic
Utterance
Because evolutionary models discuss the ultimate fitness
effects of signals, they do not answer the proximate ques-
tion whether animal signals have a meaning and convey
information. However, it is important to discuss this
question, because it clarifies the problem of whether animal
signals are possible precursors of linguistic behavior, and
what the differences between animal signaling and using
words are. I discuss an example that is often used, namely
the alarm call of vervet monkeys (see, among others,
Seyfarth and Cheney 2003; Wheeler and Fischer 2012;
Stegmann 2013).
Senders produce three different calls (to simplify, sig-
naling leopards, eagles, or snakes) and receivers respond to
the calls by appropriate hiding behavior. The evolutionary
origin of these alarm calls is explicable in terms of inclu-
sive fitness theory.1 Suppose that a vervet monkey displays
a fear response when it sees or detects a predator. This
response, accompanied by a distress call, may then evolve
into an alarm call when it results in a hide-response of
others (receivers). Kin selection teaches us that an alarm
call evolves because it increases inclusive fitness if the
receivers are kin. If there is variation in the distress/alarm
call, the signal can evolve further into three different calls
because the evolving capacity of the sender to produce
different calls and of the receiver to discriminate between
these calls leads to a further increase in inclusive fitness.
An answer to the question of how we can explain the
call at the proximate level is less easy to give since it
depends on how we conceive of the meaning of animal
signals and linguistic utterances. Two possibilities can be
distinguished. According to the first possibility, in both
animal and human communication mental acts or processes
infuse mere sounds with meaning (although it is assumed
that there are essential differences between animal signal-
ing and using a language; see below). Senders of animal
signals ‘‘mean something’’ and receivers respond ‘‘with
understanding’’ because there are mental acts or processes
involved. In the case of the alarm call, it is argued that
signals carry ‘‘referential information,’’ for the signals
alone (i.e., when receivers do not perceive a predator) elicit
the specific response (see discussions in Wheeler and
Fisher 2015; Sievers and Gruber 2016). For example, when
the sender signals ‘‘eagle’’ receivers look to the sky,
showing that they ‘‘took something’’ from the signal.
Hence it appears that the signal has a meaning that is
understood by the receiver. Three observations are men-
tioned to substantiate this possibility. First, the production
of and response to the call is to a certain extent flexible
(hence it may be an example of volitional rather than innate
behavior). Moreover the production depends on social
context, and the comprehension of the call (more than its
production) appears to depend on experience, explaining
why older monkeys make fewer mistakes than younger
ones (see further Seyfarth et al. 2010). Second, the sender
is thought to produce the alarm call in order to inform
others that there is an eagle or snake around. It is argued
that senders do not simply react to a predator with an alarm
call, but respond because they have perceived a snake, for
example. And because they have perceived the predator,
they know that there is a snake around and can subse-
quently inform others by the alarm call. In a similar vein, it
is argued that receivers, when they hear and respond to the
1 This requires, of course, far more elaboration than I can give here,
because the evolution of alarm calls also depends on the social
structure of the group. Vervet monkeys live in multi-male and multi-
female groups. Males migrate in this system to another group and then
have aggressive encounters with the already present males. The point
Footnote 1 continued
to notice is that females have more relatives within a group. Given
this social structure, female alarm calls (which probably evolved out
of an arousal system associated with fear) can increase inclusive fit-
ness by appropriate responses to different predators. Male alarm calls,
if present, probably have another origin (see further, e.g., Price et al.
2014).
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snake alarm call, believe that there is a snake out there or
that they expect a snake in their environment when they
hear the specific call, since they look for snakes if they hear
the snake alarm call. Hence there is evidence showing that
receivers can discriminate between things as they believe
or expect them to be and things not being so and can
exhibit this capacity in their behavior. Third, the alarm call
not only informs other individuals that there is a leopard,
eagle, or snake nearby, but the vocalizations also inform
the hearer that the object is dangerous. This is possible
because the call is derived from a fear response: the
emotional component of this response enables receivers to
make the inference that the object is dangerous.
If ‘‘meaning and understanding’’ are involved in animal
signaling, then one can argue that animal signaling may
have been a precursor of linguistic behavior. This is further
elaborated by arguing that both using a language and sig-
naling involve conveying representations or thoughts by
means of signals or linguistic utterances (see Fig. 1). Sig-
nals, just like linguistic utterances, evolved according to
this possibility as vehicles to communicate representations
or thoughts (see the critical discussions in Rendall et al.
2009; Rendall and Owren 2013; Scott-Phillips 2015).
According to this so-called telementational or code model
communication starts when the sender translates or
encodes ideas, representations, or concepts in the medium
of sounds for the purpose of communication. These sounds
are subsequently translated, interpreted, or decoded by the
receiver so that he or she understands what thought or
judgment was being communicated by the signal.
If animal signals and linguistic utterances are both
vehicles for communicating thoughts, what, then, is the
essential difference between animal and linguistic com-
munication? Grice (1989) argued that only humans inten-
tionally signal, i.e., they attempt to induce a change in the
mental state of the hearer (this is called the ostensive-in-
ferential model of communication). He argued that, when a
speaker means that p, he is intending to induce in his
addressee the belief that p by means of the addressee’s
recognition of the intention. When the hearer recognizes
the intention, he can infer that p was meant. This essential
difference between animal and linguistic communication
is, according to evolutionary theorists (Scott-Phillips
2015), explicable in terms of the evolution of a metapsy-
chology (involving a theory of mind) only in humans. This
metapsychology was, according to them, selected because
it enabled humans to cope with the problems of living in
large groups. However, whether only humans intentionally
signal is currently debated (see Hurford 2007; Wharton
2009; Moore 2016; Scott-Phillips 2016).
According to the second possibility, these models are
misguided for conceptual reasons. The reason is that the
idea that there are mental acts or processes involved is
rooted in the (Cartesian) conception that there are two
processes involved in the production of meaningful signals
and linguistic utterances, namely mental acts and the
physical production of sounds. This so-called dual process
theory of meaning is mistaken, for it is not mental acts or
processes that give words and sentences meaning, but other
linguistic expressions. Words have a meaning because they
Fig. 1 The telementation or
code model of animal signaling:
a representation by the sender is
encoded into a signal that is
decoded by the receiver,
enabling the receiver to respond
(adapted and modified from
Rendall et al. 2009)
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have been given an arbitrary, conventional purport that can
be explained by other expressions, e.g., by paraphrase. And
since linguistic utterances, in contrast to animal signals,
have a conventional meaning, we can only understand the
meaning of words and sentences if we understand the rules
for their use. Animal signals do not have a conventional but
a natural meaning (or function) that has been selected
during the course of evolution.2 This difference between
natural and conventional meaning is related to the form of
signals and linguistic utterances. Alarm calls, in contrast to
linguistic utterances, are not arbitrarily structured: they are
short with abrupt onsets and broadband noisy spectra.
These acoustic features are ideally suited for capturing and
affecting the attention and arousal of listeners, resulting in
predator-avoidance behavior.
The observation that the meaning of words and sen-
tences is given by other linguistic expressions has an
important consequence. It follows that there are no mental
acts of meaning that infuse ‘‘dead’’ sounds with life, as is
assumed by the code and ostensive-inferential model (see
Baker and Hacker 1984; Hacker 2013, Chap. 3),3 for there
are no separate psychological or mental acts or processes
underlying or accompanying speaking, hearing, and
understanding. Of course, when we say and mean some-
thing, we want our hearer to understand what we mean or
meant. What a speaker means by a word or sentence and
what a word or sentence means are conceptually linked.
But a conceptual link does not imply that there is a separate
mental process involved. On the contrary: speakers do not
translate their thoughts into a word or sentence (the word or
sentence being a vehicle of his or her thought) as is
assumed by the code and ostensive-inferential model, for
words or sentences are not vehicles for the communication
of thought but expressions of thought. Doubts during a
conversation about what someone means (‘‘How is that
meant?’’) are answered by a clarification: we elucidate
what we said by paraphrase or by elaborating the impli-
cations we had in mind. Hence the doubt is brought about
by two or more possible linguistic interpretations, not by
concurrent mental processes (in the mind) underlying the
utterance of the sentence that was not understood. It is for
similar reasons mistaken to assume that the hearer has to
infer the meaning, for what is meant is expressed by an
utterance he or she already understands. It follows that
when children learn the meaning of linguistic utterances,
they do not learn to link mental states or processes to words
but to couple words to other words and sentences that
explain or paraphrase what they say. If they are able to
answer the question ‘‘How is that meant?’’ they exhibit an
understanding of the relationship between two linguistic
expressions, not between dead sounds or signs and mental
acts or processes. What they mean is therefore constrained
by word meanings, not by mental acts of meaning.
The essential difference between the meaning of animal
signals and linguistic utterances is that linguistic utterances
have intra-linguistic relationships; meaning and animal
signals do not. This enables us to clarify the difference
between an alarm call and a linguistic utterance. Suppose
that there is evidence that vervet monkeys learn the dif-
ferences between the three alarm calls and can learn to
discern errors when they respond wrongly (hence it is not
an innate reaction). We can then still argue that these
behavioral data license us to say, when vervet monkeys
perceive the snake-alarm call, that they believe or know
that there is a snake around. For example if they hide in
trees and look to the ground, we can say that they believe
that there is a snake around. However, we can now add that
animals cannot explain what they mean by the signal since
they cannot explain what they are doing (see further
Rundle 1997; Hacker 2013). Hence we can distinguish
doing something for a reason from behaving because there
was a reason. Only humans can act for a reason because
they can reason (can explain, give reasons, etc.). A vervet
monkey will change the path along which it was sprinting
because it noticed a snake there. Yet it did not apprehend
the snake then as a reason, for only a creature that acts in
the light of reason can act for a reason and can apprehend
something as a reason: it is the warrant explaining why it is
done. And because such a creature can explain and justify
its act by reference to a reason, it can also understand the
pros of an action and the cons against it. Hence it can
deliberate and can make reasonable choices. Vervet mon-
keys cannot do that, and when they choose one behavioral
option above another as a means to an end, they do not
engage in reasoning, for they cannot explain or warrant
their behavior by reference to there being a snake on the
path. Hence they cannot inform others, after they return to
the group, that they changed their path for the reason that
they otherwise might have been attacked (they can only
signal to others that there is a snake). Creatures can act for
a reason if they can reason, i.e., can deduce consequences
from assumptions or infer explanations from data (as
opposed to only seeing and apprehending something). And
this is what human children learn when they learn to rea-
son, i.e., when they learn to answer questions by giving
2 Notice also a similar difference between an animal signal and the
smoke signal used by humans (for example, signaling the election of a
new Pope). We can only understand the smoke signal if we know the
meaning of rules determining what the signal means. Hence the
smoke signal is also an example of a conventional signal.
3 Notice that information does not grow or develop in the brain or
mind of a child; information has to be acquired by the child (Smit
2014, Chap. 2). Hence, answering the question of whether animal
signals transmit information is investigating the problem of whether
animals are in possession of information because they perceive and
therefore know things, and whether they can transmit this information
to others.
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reasons. Vervet monkeys may be prepared for alternative
possibilities and can solve problems and discern errors (this
does not involve reflectively reconsidering a belief). But
they can only solve problems in behaving (they are sensi-
tive to current occurrences in their environment), for
solving problems without behaving is restricted to a lan-
guage-using creature. Vervet monkeys can only recognize,
associate, learn, and anticipate, whereas a language-using
creature can also reflect, deliberate, reason, infer, ruminate,
and so on.
Using a Language is a Normative Activity
While the question of whether animal signaling is or is not
an example of volitional, conative behavior is debated,
linguistic behavior is certainly an example of volitional
behavior. Moreover, it differs from animal signaling, for
only users of a language can explain the meaning of
utterances. Children learn to use words correctly. They do
not only respond to an explanation of their parents (for
example, when their parents point to a fruit in order to
explain the word ‘‘apple’’), but they also learn then what is
to be done. Acquiring the ability to use words is acquiring a
technique enabling children to participate in a normative
practice. A child can be said to have mastered the use of a
word (say ‘‘red’’) if his or her linguistic behavior accords
with the acknowledged rules for the correct employment of
that word. For example a child understands what red is if
he or she points to a ripe tomato for explaining the meaning
of ‘‘red,’’ can correct mistakes of others and of him- or her-
self, and so on and so forth. In general, whether a child
possesses the ability to use words and sentences is deter-
mined by testing whether he or she (1) can use a language
(e.g., words) correctly, (2) can explain its use correctly, and
(3) responds appropriately to its use in context.
These observations raise the problem of how the tran-
sition from (natural) signaling to the (conventional) nor-
mative practice of using a language was (evolution) and is
(ontogenesis) accomplished. The answer I shall discuss
below is that language did not evolve directly as an
extension of animal signaling (derived from expressions of
emotions and sensations), but out of babbling. The idea that
babbling is the precursor of linguistic behavior is of course
not new. Yet there are three empirical reasons and one
conceptual reason why it was and is difficult to see why
these vocalizations may have been evolutionary precursors
of using words. I briefly discuss the empirical reasons and
then discuss the conceptual problem at length.
First, these vocalizations occur at lower amplitudes and
are therefore harder to observe than signals such as crying
(see, e.g., Oller et al. 2013). Because it seems that these
vocalizations are produced accidentally and do not elicit a
specific response in receivers, it was thought that they do
not have a function. Second, they do not signal need or
distress and, hence, appear to be of less importance for
infant survival than, for example, distress signals. How-
ever, the point to notice is that this does not exclude the
possibility that the vocalizations have an inclusive fitness
effect in the context of social interactions with the child’s
parents (and siblings), e.g., turn taking and later triadic
interactions (Smit 2013, 2014). Third, babbling appears to
serve only as a preparation for adulthood and does not
seem to have an adaptive function in the developmental
stage in which it is performed. Although it is possible that
babbling does not have (or no longer has) a function during
the first year and is only a precursor of later linguistic
behavior, we still have to explain how this developmental
trajectory was selected during the course of evolution (this
problem will not be discussed here).
There is an important conceptual reason why it was
difficult to see that babbling may have been an evolution-
ary precursor of using words. Babbling precedes the use of
words, yet there is, as we have seen above, an essential
difference between using words and producing these
vocalizations. Using words (but not babbling) involves the
ability to explain words, and that is a normative activity
(we can make and correct mistakes when we use a lan-
guage). Hence, when a child points to a rose and asks ‘‘Red
?’’ parents can correct him or her by saying ‘‘No, pink.’’
But when an infant utters the babble ‘‘Baba,’’ the parents
do not, at first, respond by saying ‘‘No, you mean yaya.’’ I
add here the phrase ‘‘at first,’’ for during turn taking and
triadic interactions, children are capable of adjusting their
vocalizations to what they hear, and parents provide infants
with age-appropriate support enabling children to improve
their emergent linguistic skills (see the ‘‘Learning Words in
a Pedagogical Context’’ section). Hence, for understanding
the evolution of the use of words it is essential to explain
how during the course of evolution (and during ontogen-
esis) the transition from babbling to the normative practice
of using words was (and is) accomplished. For under-
standing this transition it is essential to first discuss and
resolve three conceptual problems.
First, recall that most animal signals evolved as the
outcome of the process of ritualization. This process can be
studied with the aid of evolutionary theory because sen-
sations and emotions are characterized by peculiar forms of
duration and degree and by their (species-specific) char-
acteristic behavioral expression. Furthermore, there is often
a sequence discernable in these expressions, e.g., the
opening of the mouth (revealing the teeth) during the
expression of aggression in dogs precedes an attack. A dog
observing an aggressive opponent can for this reason detect
a part (a cue) of the behavioral expression and, hence, can
anticipate the attack, resulting in the threat signal ‘‘teeth-
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baring’’ by the process of ritualization. By contrast,
understanding a word, phrase, or sentence, and meaning
something by a linguistic expression do not have genuine
duration. They are not being in a mental state (it is not like
being aggressive for some time) but akin to an ability. If
someone is able to V (V represents uses of psychological
verbs), her or his behavior that exhibits understanding is
constitutive evidence for possession of the ability. The
ability consists in being able to explain what words,
phrases, and sentences mean. Hence when we listen to
someone and understand what she says, then we can
explain what she said and respond cogently to her words
and can act for the reason that such-and-such was said.
That understanding a language is akin to an ability also
clarifies why suddenly understanding something is not the
beginning of a mental state, but the dawning of a cluster of
abilities or possibilities of action and response. We realize
then what is meant and what we can do with words.
Consequently, language, unlike animal signals, probably
did not evolve by the process of ritualization (though its
precursors, such as lip smacking and babbling–signaling
that an individual is prepared to engage in a social inter-
action–probably evolved by this process, cf. Van Hooff
1972).
Second, grammar of language is autonomous: explana-
tions of linguistic expressions are given by other linguistic
expressions and, hence, remain within language. The
meaning of words and sentences are specified by explana-
tions of their meaning. Consequently, how someone has
learnt a language is for this reason irrelevant for answering
the question whether he can use a language, knows or
understands the meaning of words and sentences, and
whether he has grasped their use and can explain their
meaning. Of course, children learn a language (by imitation,
emulation, socially guided learning, etc.; see, e.g., Whiten
et al. (2004) for an explanation of these different forms of
learning), and saying that grammar is autonomous is not to
deny that language learning is an important precondition for
understanding a language. But a creature’s pedagogical
history is not a criterion for whether a creature has the
ability to speak a language. We do not determine whether an
alien is speaking a language or just emitting noise by
investigating its past—we investigate what it can now do.
Whether a child possesses this ability is determined by
testing whether he or she can use a language correctly. To
have acquired the use of a language, as Wittgenstein (2009
[1953], par. 150) put it, is to have mastered a technique, and
the technique mastered is a normative one. Hence, learning
a language is important, but whether a child has mastered a
language is only tested by the end product.
Third, the observation that training and learning are
irrelevant for testing whether someone can use a language
correctly requires an explanation of how the transition from
babbling to the normative practice of using words was
(evolution) and is (ontogenesis) accomplished. I shall argue
below that it is essential to conceive of the child as an agent
or experimenter. For once the child has passed from the
first stages of experimenting with gestures and vocaliza-
tions in social and pedagogical contexts to using some
words, he or she can ask caregivers what so-and-so is and
can ask what such-and-such words mean. These questions
are answered by means of explanations of meanings of
words. Because these explanations of meaning remain
within language, children learn the rules for the use of
words and become then participants of a normative prac-
tice. Of course, the meaning of some words is explained by
pointing to objects (e.g., ostensive definitions), but it is
important to recall that explanations by ostensive gestures
do not connect language to objects but also remain within
language (cf. Hacker 2001, Chap. 9; Baker and Hacker
2005, essay 5; Smit 2014, Chap. 2). These explanations
only connect spoken language with the ‘‘language of
gestures.’’
The Evolution of Consonants and Vowels
Children start to experiment with gestures and vocaliza-
tions in the second half of their first year. Well-known
transitions occurring during this period are the shifts from
babbling to canonical or reduplicated babbling to the use of
words. Following Oller (2000), we can distinguish various
articulation stages. First, the primitive articulation stage
(1–4 months), resulting in the first ‘‘goo’’- and ‘‘coo’’-type
syllables. At 3–8 months (the expansion/exploratory
stage), infants begin to produce marginal syllables, which
are slow sequences of consonant–vowel articulation. In the
canonical syllable stage (starting at 5–10 months), infants
begin to produce fully resonant sounds and faster conso-
nant–vowel alternations, resulting in canonical syllables
(e.g., ‘‘Bababa’’). Children produce the first words at
12–15 months.
An important pattern in babbling is the serial pattern in
the case of canonical babbling: the alternation of vowels
and consonants. Note that this is also the basic pattern of
words. Hence, for understanding the evolution of speech it
is essential to answer the question of what led to alternation
of vowels and consonants. For if we understand the basic
patterns of vowel-consonant alternation, we can explain
how the use of more complex patterns was superimposed
on this basic pattern resulting in the ability to do various
things with words. MacNeilage (1998, 2008) has argued
that the basic pattern of speech is the continual rhythmic
alternation between an open and closed mouth imposed on
the sound production process. The production of the first
vowels (e.g., [a]) involves the opening of the mouth,
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whereas the production of the first consonants (e.g., [b])
involves the closing of the mouth. The assumption here is
that during the early stages of language development the
infant exerts independent control only of the jaw, while
other articulators (lips, tongue, and soft palate) have lim-
ited capacity to actively vary their position in the brief span
of a syllable. For example, during jaw oscillation, if the
tongue is in its resting position, the elevating movements of
the mandible will make the lips form a passive constriction
and produce a labial consonant, while lowering the jaw
produces a central vowel. When the ability to exert control
on the articulators increases and infants acquire a greater
ability to master fine local movements of articulators (in-
volving the tongue and lips), variegation emerges (in-
volving cortical regulation of speech). Hence, after the
stage of reduplicated babbling the original reiterations
(‘‘Bababa’’) are replaced by utterances in which children
produce, for example, different consonants and/or vowels
in successive syllables (e.g., from ‘‘Mamama’’ and ‘‘To-
toto’’ to ‘‘Tomato’’).
It is possible that, during our evolutionary history, the
production of babbles had a signaling function, for example
in the context of mother–child interaction (possibly as an
extension of motor patterns involved in sucking, licking, or
chewing) or in the context of grooming (it is presupposed
here that babbling possibly evolved out of lip smacking).
The original small repertoire of signals was later extended
as the result of an increase in vocal flexibility into a
complex, combinatorial system, enabling children to do
various things with words (resulting in linguistic behavior).
It is assumed that good imitation skills and later more
complex forms of learning were essential here. The crucial
step in this scenario is that signals acquired in the end
meaning, i.e., the signal ‘‘mama’’ became then the spoken
word or sign for ‘‘mother’’ (still later, humans invented a
written symbol for ‘‘mother’’). The signal became a spoken
word when humans were able to do something with this
utterance, e.g., as a call or exclamation (‘‘Mama!’’)
resulting in maternal attention. Not surprisingly, there was
probably at first no sharp distinction between the first use
of words (signs) and signals, because both were produced
to draw (or direct) the attention of another (to something).
If there were at first morphological and physiological
limitations to the production of sounds, then we can expect
universal patterns in the production of babbles during the
early stages of ontogenesis (and presumably evolution).
For example, there is some evidence that there are three
intrasyllabic consonant and vowel co-occurrence patterns
in babbling (MacNeilage and Davis 2000): (1) labial con-
sonants with central vowels, (2) coronal consonants with
front vowels, and (3) dorsal consonants with back vowels
(see Fig. 2). Cross-linguistic studies of infant babbling
show that these three co-occurrences are present in many
cultures. There is also the possibility of a fourth, intersyl-
labic pattern, namely a tendency to begin a word with a
labial stop consonant, and then, after the vowel, to produce
a coronal stop consonant. This pattern probably evolved
because it is easier to produce a labial consonant than a
coronal consonant.
It is unclear, however, whether the rhythmic jaw oscil-
lations, which permit canonical syllables during evolution
and ontogenesis were or are shaped by the physiology and
neuroanatomy of jaw control. The alternative hypothesis is
that these rhythmic movements are the result of a general
(whole-organism) developmental pattern, because similar
movements occur in the limbs at the same time as the jaw
(Iverson et al. 2007; see also Giulivi et al. 2011; Mac-
Neilage and Davis 2011; Oller 2011; Whalen et al. 2011).
Babbling and later linguistic behavior possibly evolved
when hominids started to wean children at an earlier time
(see Smit 2009, 2013). This became possible when they
started to cooperate in the context of hunting large game
(but also in the context of digging tubers, etc.). Food was
(in the evolving hunter–gatherer societies) then present on
a regular basis, enabling hominids to wean children earlier,
for humans could use protein-rich meat (but also plant food
and tubers) as a supplement to and alternative for maternal
milk. Installing earlier weaning, however, required new
adaptations. For example ‘‘tiny incisors’’ (milk teeth)
evolved enabling children to consume solid food at an early
age (milk teeth are absent in other apes). It also required
behavioral adaptations enabling mothers and children to
Fig. 2 A schematic view of the speech apparatus. The three arrows
depict three co-occurrence patterns of consonants and vowels, and
their connection with articulators such as the lips and the soft palate
(adapted and modified from MacNeilage and Davis 2000)
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adjust their communicative behavior to early weaning. I
have suggested that babbling (but also gestures like
pointing, etc.) and later linguistic behavior evolved because
these behaviors optimized the functioning of food provi-
sioning in the family and group, and, hence, increased the
inclusive fitness of individuals living in families and
groups. I have also suggested that there may be intrage-
nomic conflicts involved, for there is evidence that muta-
tions of imprinted genes affect the development of
babbling and speech.
It is important to notice that I do not, in contrast to
others, presuppose that mental acts or processes infuse
dead signs with life, for children do not translate thoughts
into words and later word combinations, but do things with
words (see above). For example, Davis and MacNeilage
(2004); see also MacNeilage (2008, Chap. 7), following the
misguided ideas of Levelt (1992) and Levelt et al. (1999)
and numerous computational psychologists, assume that
there are two processes involved in the production of
speech. They assume that there is a planning and organi-
zation process preceding actual production of speech by the
peripheral mechanisms such as the tongue, lips, and jaw.
Levelt suggests that (during ontogenesis and evolution)
real word production begins when the child starts con-
necting some particular babble or a modification thereof to
some particular lexical concept. At later stages of ontoge-
nesis and evolution these lexical concepts determine the
order of words in a sentence. However, the problem is that
there are not two processes involved in speaking, for there
is no such thing as a mental planning and organization
process preceding speech. And one cannot connect a con-
cept to a babble or word; we can give a word a use and we
can teach children how to use the words of their language,
but children or parents do not thereby connect concepts to
words or babbles (when children have mastered the use of a
word, we can say that they have acquired the concept
expressed by that word). Levelt’s suggestion is akin to
supposing that in order for a coin to be worth two euros, we
have to connect the value to the coin (see further Bennett
and Hacker 2006, 2015).
Learning Words in a Pedagogical Context
Humans are unique for a biological reason: only in humans
an innate ability evolved to learn a language (Kenny 1975,
Chap. 1; Kenny 1989, Chap. 10; Smit 2014, Chaps. 6 and
7). But we have additionally seen that learning a language
is also a unique human capacity, since the use of language
involves the correct and incorrect applications of rules.
Learning the use of language was therefore linked to the
evolution of asymmetric roles in the family or group: the
pupil had to understand that the teacher is the one who is
explaining something, whereas the teacher had to check
whether the pupil understood what was explained (Csibra
and Gergely 2006, 2009). Indeed, empirical studies have
shown that socially guided learning is involved in the
transition from babbling to doing things with words.
Babbling induces or invites socially guided vocal
learning by parents, i.e., when children start to babble, their
parents are inclined to join the activity children are at that
moment engaged in and respond to their experimental
activities and vocalizations with infant-directed speech.
Children begin then to respond to the cues and encour-
agement provided by their parents by improving their skills
and vocal capacities.4 One study indicates that parents of
11-month-olds produce about 300 infant-directed utter-
ances per hour, and that another 500 utterances per hour,
though not directed to the infant, fall on the infant’s ears
(see further Locke 2001). That environmental input is
important for the development of speech can also be
inferred from studies of deaf and hearing-impaired infants.
From 6 months onward their babbling is acoustically dif-
ferent from that of hearing infants with a delay in the onset
of canonical syllables (see Oller and Eilers 1988; Locke
1993).
Studies have shown that children modify their vocal-
izations when they are exposed to infant-directed utter-
ances (cf. Locke 1993; Baldwin and Moses 1996; Oller
2000). For example 9-month-old infants can change their
babbling to reflect sound patterns in their mother’s speech
within minutes. Hence the interactions with caregivers
facilitate the development of speech perception and pro-
duction, presumably because they focus the attention of
infants on relevant features of the vocal sounds (and,
hence, restrict possibilities). It also enables infants to learn
from the consequences of their vocalizing (they can use
feedback from the caregiver) and to acquire an under-
standing of the contingencies of communicative interac-
tion. Interestingly (but obvious to parents and anyone
watching parents), there is evidence that parents adjust
their utterances to the vocalizations of infants (Oller et al.
2001). Throughout the first year, parent and infant interact
and engage in vocal turn-taking. Studies have shown that
parents are sensitive to infants’ vocalizations and respond
more to speech-like elements in these vocalizations (for
example, they are capable of recognizing that their infants’
babbling is more speech-like). They adjust their responses
to the different prelinguistic vocalizations in the sense that
they increase the complexity of their interactions when
4 This requires vocal flexibility. Vocal flexibility, in contrast to
flexibility of gesture, was probably limited in the early hominids. It
evolved as the result of the selection of variations of genes such as
FOXP2 (because the product of this transcription factor is, among
other things, involved in the control of fine orofacial movements,
enabling hominids to develop articulate speech; see Enard 2011).
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infants become more skilled. This is called ‘‘acoustic scaf-
folding,’’ because parents provide infants with age-appro-
priate support for their emerging linguistic skills. Hence
parents realize that babbling shows that children become
experimenters eager to seek information enabling them to
improve and refine their vocalizing abilities. For example,
9-month-old infants, interacting with parents producing
consonant–vowel (CV) words as a response to their bab-
bling, increased the proportion of syllables with CV structure
(Goldstein and Schwade 2008). This was probably not the
result of imitating, for the infants did not produce the same
phonemes as their mothers used. It may be an example of
acquiring the capacity to restructure their own vocalizations
into a CV structure matching the ones of their parents. Hence
the activity of babbling, together with the responses of the
parents, creates socially guided learning.
Infants often babble when they look at and manipulate
objects. When parents respond to their babbling, they create
opportunities for children to learn links between vocaliza-
tions and these objects. Studies show that parents display
more verbal responses to object-directed babbling of infants
(e.g., by using object labels) resulting in larger vocabularies
of the infants at 15 months. Shared attention (both parent and
infant attend to an object) and pointing here facilitates
learning. Goldstein and Schwade (2009), Goldstein et al.
(2010) hypothesize that object-oriented babbling of children
signals that they are focusing their attention on the object and
are also indicating that they are prepared to learn about the
visual features of it. Hence, there is a connection between
acoustic learning and learning more about the object to
which they are responding vocally, again facilitating the
transition from babbling to the use of words.
Word comprehension starts in the second half of the first
year. It coincides with object displacement activities (actions
in which children move one toy in relation to another, e.g.,
putting one nesting cup into another, or feeding a doll with a
spoon). These object displacement activities are examples of
volitional behavior, because children orient the object first
and then act on it. They can be subdivided into separations
(disassembling of complex objects into parts) and con-
structions (assembling complex objects out of parts). Feed-
ing a doll with a spoon is also an example of construction, for
the child uses here a property of one object in relation to the
other. Studies show that separations precede constructions
during play, and that the use of words starts when children
begin to construct complex objects (see among others Iver-
son 2010). Note that object construction is less simple than
separating complex objects. Also note that, when children
only separate objects, it is at first the parent who reconstructs
the complex one from the parts so that children can separate
them again. The important point to notice is that, as soon as
children can construct relations, they can also experiment
with varying by creating novel combinations (and by
observing the consequences of their actions), enabling them
to learn more about the specific properties of objects. Hence
in the course of putting objects together, they also start to
connect meaning with a referent, i.e., begin to use words.
Words and their meanings are learnt in the context of playing
with, manipulation, and acting on toys in new and more
specific ways, depending in part on developing motor skills.
Word comprehension also correlates in this period with the
emergence of deitic gestures (e.g., giving, showing, and
pointing). The use of these gestures correlates with the first
signs of tool use, the categorization of the basis of different
features, and imitation of novel acts that were not already in
the behavioral repertoire of the child. An important skill
children master in the period is joint attention, i.e., they learn
to attend to objects and events that adults are watching or
indicating; this is seen as a part of the emergence of the
system of natural pedagogy (Csibra and Gergely 2006, 2009;
see also Tomasello 2008; Smit 2013).
Around 12 months children start to name objects. This is
preceded by the brief reproduction of actions associated
with objects, e.g., briefly putting a phone to the ear or a cup
to the lip. These are called ‘‘recognitory gestures’’ (also
called symbolic play schemes), because they seem to know
what the object is and what it is used for. The gestures are
thought to be a form of nonverbal use of signs because the
gestures are brief and stylized in form (e.g., the child who
touches cup to lip seems to distinguish between the
‘‘recognitory gesture’’ and ‘‘real drinking,’’ for children are
not surprised that there is nothing to drink). Moreover, they
sometimes produce the gestures empty-handed. The point
to notice is that prior to the emergence of these recognitory
gestures, infants act on objects for the purpose of manip-
ulating them. These manipulations are often not specific for
the objects. With the appearance of the recognitory ges-
tures, they are able to use action for the purpose of
assigning specific meanings to objects. For this reason it is
thought that using these gestures also facilitates the
acquisition of the ability to convey meaning by words.
Parents respond to recognitory gestures by asking questions
related to the meaning of the objects. For example, when a
child brings a telephone to his or her ear, parents ask: ‘‘Are
you calling someone?’’ or ‘‘Is that Daddy?’’ Or if the child
touches a cup to the lips of a doll they can ask: ‘‘Is she
hungry?’’ Recognitory gestures are transient, for as soon as
children acquire the ability to use words, these gestures
drop off.
Doers Become Thinkers
When children acquire the ability to use words they can
engage in simple language games. These games are closely
linked to what they do and, hence, are context dependent.
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For instance, they use these words to call their mother
(‘‘Mama!’’), to name the object they are playing with
(‘‘Car’’), or to express their wants (‘‘Give!’’) or emotions
(‘‘Angry!’’). These linguistic acts are moves in simple
language games.
When their vocabulary expands in their second and third
year, they start to make word combinations and later sen-
tences with the aid of a grammar. For example, after they
have learnt to replace their natural expressions of the
sensation of pain (crying, screaming out of pain) by ‘‘Ow,’’
they learn to extend this expression with ‘‘It hurts,’’ ‘‘Have
pain,’’ or ‘‘I have pain,’’ and to apply these predicates to
others (‘‘He has pain’’). Moreover they learn to indicate
where their pain is located (‘‘I have a pain in my toe’’) and
to explain why they have pain (‘‘I have stubbed my toe’’).
A similar story can be told in the case of emotions and
perceptions. Children learn to extend their natural expres-
sions of, for example, fear (screaming) with linguistic
expressions (‘‘I am afraid’’) and learn to specify the object
of their fear (‘‘A scary dog’’). Next children learn that the
expressions of emotion may be reasonable or unreasonable.
For example, when they are scared because of a dog, their
parents may explain to them that the scary dog is a friendly
one, and hence, that it is unreasonable to be afraid. By
playing as-if games, children learn to pretend, enabling
them to understand the difference between being sincere
and insincere. They also learn then to deceive others. Their
ability to engage in language games involving perception
extends when they are taught the use of verbs of perception
as operators of names and descriptions of perceptibilia, for
example when caregivers ask them questions (‘‘Did you see
Daddy?’’ or ‘‘Can you hear the bird?’’). They subsequently
learn that the objects of perception are sometimes defective
(‘‘It looks like …, but …’’) because observational condi-
tions are sometimes suboptimal or since the sense organs
are (temporarily) malfunctioning. They begin then to
understand that the objects of perception and description
are sometimes deceptive and look other than they are.
Hence the language games involving perception begin with
the use of words and, when the perceptual vocabulary
expands, end with the use of qualifying observational
sentences.
As the result of mastering word combinations and later
the use of sentences involving a grammar, children become
sensitive to reason. They can explain why they have pain,
are angry (‘‘because you took my …’’) and correct mis-
takes (‘‘It appeared red at first, but it is not’’). They acquire
the ability to reason formally or logically subsequent to
having learnt to describe things. For they begin then to
understand that sentences are used to describe something
that can be true or false. And because descriptions (what
are called propositions by logicians) can be true and can be
false, they begin to understand the use of logical
connectives since this is bound up with the use of ‘‘true’’
and ‘‘false’’ (if, for example, the sentence ‘‘Milk is black’’
is false, milk is not black). Hence, learning the use of true
and false is interlaced with learning to use logical con-
nectives. The use of this simple conceptual network (con-
sisting of descriptions, questions, answers, logical
connectives, yes or no, true and false) is, in turn, extended
with the concept of logical consequences leading to the first
forms of formal reasoning and thinking. For the concepts of
thinking and reasoning are grammatically interwoven with
the use of phrases like ‘‘it follows,’’ ‘‘therefore’’ and ‘‘so.’’
For example, if milk is white, then it follows that it is not
black. Importantly, learning all these concepts is embedded
in forms of action (see Baker and Hacker 2009, Chap. 7), in
what we call saying the same thing, saying something
different, denying what we said, contradicting oneself, etc.
It is interwoven with justifying what we say and do by
reference to reasons and reasoning, but also with under-
standing, misunderstanding, and not understanding. This
conceptual network that children begin to master during
their third and fourth year is constitutive of their devel-
oping ability to reason and think.
When the ability to reason further expands in their third
and fourth year, children can also think conditional
thoughts, can think of how things are and how things are
not, can conceive of general truths, can think of what does
and what does not exist, can use modal expressions and
counterfactuals, and so on. Hence, the ability to reason and
the use of a tensed language enable children to think of
possibilities (to imagine). They start to think about the
future and the past; they can think what would happen if…,
or what it would be like if … Because they can imagine
something different, they begin to understand that one can
think falsely. Children can then express thoughts and
beliefs and begin to understand that others have thoughts
and beliefs. This explains why developmental psycholo-
gists have found that children, who can reason and have
mastered the use of a tensed language, and so on, can solve
false belief tasks at this age, for they can infer what
someone believes given what he or she knows in a
certain situation.
The ability to reason and to give reasons enables chil-
dren to pursue goals beyond the immediate environment in
space and time, for they can then express thoughts about
the future and past. Consequently, there is a difference
between the intentional behavior of doers and thinkers,
between simple and complex forms of heralding an action.
Simple forms are linked to the animal forms of commu-
nication, like giving, taking, throwing, wanting, etc. In
these cases forming and heralding an action is linked to
what children (and animals) will do next (‘‘Give toy’’ or
‘‘Take toy’’ are followed by the act of giving or taking).
Older children (3–4 years old) learn to extend these
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primitive forms of intentional actions with more complex
ones when they have mastered the use of a tensed lan-
guage, and so on, enabling them to form long-term inten-
tions (e.g., ‘‘I will return the toy I borrow from you next
Wednesday’’). The nexus between expressions of inten-
tions and immediate performance weakens then. Hence,
intentional behavior is rooted in goal-directed behavior
(also displayed by the other animals), but only children
using a tensed language can learn to form and herald long-
term intentions. Although there is at first no gap between
animals and children (both can pursue goals and can
respond to the goal-directed behaviors displayed by oth-
ers), only children acquire the skill to refer to entities
outside the communication situation, to talk about persons
who are not present, to focus their attention on something
unrelated to current needs and wishes, and so on and so
forth.
The shift from doing things with words to reasoning and
giving reasons has an important consequence. While we
can assume that the first linguistic acts like begging or
demanding have been selected because of their inclusive
fitness effects, this is less easy to see in the case of the
moves in complex language games, like meaning some-
thing, intending to do something, reasoning and giving
reasons, etc. For when children can mean something, they
can explain with the aid of other words what they mean.
And when they can do something for a reason, the reason is
not a cause of what they intend to do but a warrant (hence
they can answer the question why they do something).
Thus, the shift that I have discussed from doers to thinkers
goes hand in hand with an increase in behavioral flexibility
and a decrease of the causal role of genes in children’s
behavior. Acquiring an understanding of a complex lan-
guage frees children from the constraints imposed by genes
evolution, for it enables them to pursue self-selected goals.
Conclusion
I have discussed how linguistic behavior evolved out of
babbling. Two innovations were essential. First, linguistic
behavior could evolve because the vocalizing powers of
our ancestors expanded as the result of enhanced control,
mediated by the cortex, of the vocal apparatus. This
enabled our ancestors to extend and replace babbling with
what became linguistic expressions consisting of different
vowels and consonants in successive syllables. Second,
speech coevolved with an extension of socially guided
learning. Socially guided learning or natural pedagogy
probably evolved two to three million years ago when our
ancestors started to improve tools and to use them for
different purposes. I assume that the use of these tools was,
at first, explained by communicative behaviors like
ostension, referencing, gaze following, pointing, giving and
taking, joint attention and action, and imitation. Notice that
these behaviors presuppose a division of labor between
tutor and pupil, for teaching and learning are possible if
both teacher and pupil understand who is emitting the
information and who is supposed to pick up the ‘‘intended’’
information. The child has to observe the eyes of the tea-
cher in order to extract the relevant information, whereas
the teacher has to observe the child in order to see whether
the information is conveyed. One can imagine that subse-
quent to the use of the first words, talking to children (in-
fant-directed speech) strengthened the conveying of
information. Teaching and learning were a precondition for
language evolution, since the rules for the use of words
have to be explained to children.
Humans are nowadays unique for a biological reason:
only in humans an innate ability evolved to learn the rule-
governed use of a language. But learning a language is also
a unique human capacity since the use of language is a
normative practice. I have argued that the shift from bab-
bling to using words is the result of a developmental and
evolutionary transition, for there is an essential difference
between babbling and the rule-governed use of words (see
also Smit 2014; Smit and Hacker 2014). The essential step
in the transition was taken when children could ask ques-
tions that were answered by their parents, for they could
then learn the meaning of linguistic utterances. They
became participants of the normative practice of using a
language. Because explanations of meaning remain within
language, the pedagogical history (i.e., the gestures and
vocalizations that were essential parts of the preceding
forms of teaching and learning) dropped off. Of course, it is
presupposed here that their parents, as members of a family
and group, gave words a use.5 Babbling and later using
words possibly evolved because, during the early stages of
language evolution, these new forms of communicative
behavior increased inclusive fitness of individuals living in
families and groups. The essential point to notice here is
that language evolved because humans could do things
with words: to demand, beg, and request; to call people and
to respond to calls; to express needs, sensations, and
emotions and to respond to the expressions of others; to ask
and answer questions; to name things and to describe and
to respond to descriptions of how things are; to reason and
to give reasons; and so on and so forth. Hence, natural
selection could operate on individuals performing simple
linguistic acts and later exercising a complex ability.
Future studies will reveal the role of (the products of) genes
5 To give a word a use requires that humans were able to make
(vocal) innovations and, hence, requires behavioral and vocal
flexibility. Hence we can predict that the genes involved in language
evolution (see note 4) increased the vocal powers and enhanced the
capacity to learn and memorize words and gestures.
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in the transition from babbling to linguistic behavior. They
will also clarify the role of genes in the shift from simple
linguistic acts (begging, demanding) to the exercise of the
ability to use a complex language with a grammar (en-
abling humans to construct sentences, etc.). Language
evolution expanded the horizon of human thought. The
horizon of nonhuman animals’ thought is determined by
what they can express in their nonverbal behavior, whereas
the horizon of human thought is determined by what can be
expressed in nonverbal and linguistic behavior. Since lan-
guage evolved from simple to more complex linguistic
behavior, these limits evolved too. What humans could do
with words expanded during the course of evolution,
resulting in a gap between humans and the other animals.
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